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During the second half of the twentieth century, at the time of the foundation of 
the Fifth Republic, French engineers endorsed enthusiastically technocratic 
ideals. Their attitude was not only the product of a specific context. It was rooted 
in a long tradition of connection between French engineering and social 
preoccupations. This connection emerged at the time of the creation of the first 
corps of State engineers in the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries. Indeed, State 
engineers were from the start convinced that they had a social mission. 
Subsequent episodes, like the Saint-Simonian reflections on the eve of 
industrialization, or the discussions held in the think tank X-Crise in the aftermath 
of the 1929 economic crisis contributed also to shape the engineers' sensitivity to 
social issues. Dwelling on these episodes, but also trying to go beyond their 
standard assessment, we would like to propose here a more general interpretation 
of the complex set of relations between French engineering and social thought. In 
this perspective, the Post-World-War-II French engineers' technocratic concerns 
come at the end of a long and complex evolution. This case study should enable a 
better understanding of the more general connivance between engineering culture 
and technocratic ideals. 
 
 
 
INTRODUCTION 
 
  1   2 
                                                
Technocracy may be defined as the tendency to give precedence to technological 
competence over political legitimacy, to rational administration over the hazards 
of public debate. Whereas the word was coined in the United States during the 
first half of the twentieth century, the attitude it designates is more pervasive and 
elements of it can be traced back to previous periods.1 In the French case, the 
technocratic attitude adopted by many engineers after World War II, an attitude 
that reached its climax during the first years of the Fifth Republic (1958 - ), must 
be replaced in the more general frame of an enduring connection between 
engineering and social preoccupations, a connection probably stronger than in 
some other countries. 
 
This connection is to a certain extent imputable to the role played by the state in 
the history of the French engineering profession. The point has been made by 
various authors, from philosophers and economists like Friedrich August von 
Hayek to historians like Kenneth Alder, Gabrielle Hecht or Bruno Belhoste.2 But 
the complex set of relations between French engineering and social thought are 
not entirely reducible to this aspect. Our ambition here is to provide a more 
detailed account of the emergence and transformation of French engineers' social 
views from the eighteenth century to the twentieth, and to contribute thus to a 
better understanding of why and how they became technocratic at a certain point. 
 
This study reveals a mix of specific features and of characteristics shared by 
engineers all over the world. Once the distinction has been made between the 
specific and the more generic, a better understanding of the connection between 
engineering culture at large and technocratic ideals becomes possible using 
French engineers as a case study. As we will argue, these engineers were not 
technocratic from the start, not even at the time of the Revolution or during the 
first half of the nineteenth century. Their trajectory is nevertheless representative 
of general cultural features that have been present for a long time among 
 
1 On the American origin of the term, see infra. Since elements constitutive of technocratic ideals 
can be traced back to former historical periods, it is possible to use the term for these periods. This 
is what Bruno Belhoste and Konstantinos Chatzis have chosen to do in their article "From 
Technical Corps to Technocratic Power" published in the present issue. We prefer as for us to 
reserve the term to twentieth-century movements. 
2 Von Hayek, The Counter-Revolution of Science; Alder, Engineering the Revolution; Hecht, The 
Radiance of France; Belhoste, La Formation d'une Technocratie.   3 
                                                
engineers, features that may explain the emergence of technocratic ideals among 
them in the twentieth century. 
 
 
FRENCH ENGINEERING AND SOCIAL AWARENESS: A BRIEF 
HISTORICAL OUTLINE 
 
A series of key episodes have shaped French engineers sensitivity to political and 
social questions prior to the emergence of a distinctive technocratic attitude in the 
second half of the twentieth century. Rather than episode, the terms layer or 
stratum are probably more appropriate here; for each of these episodes has left its 
imprint and their superimposition is part of the distinctive identity of French 
engineering culture. What we would like to propose here is a kind of archeology 
of French engineers' sense of social responsibility, a sense of social responsibility 
that explains their subsequent adherence to technocratic ideals. 
 
The first of these episodes is the military foundation of the engineering profession 
in the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries. In France, engineering emerged as an 
activity related to war, to fortification in particular. Until the Enlightenment, 
engineers were officers generally belonging to the nobility. These military roots 
entailed a certain number of key characteristics. Among them, one finds the 
engineers' firm belief to belong to an elite defined by virtues of courage and 
knowledge. This elitist streak was further reinforced by the organization of the 
fortification engineers in a corps towards the end of the seventeenth century, an 
organization that was soon to serve as a model for other branches of engineering.3 
Beside elitism, corporatism was to remain another enduring feature of the French 
engineering profession. A last key element was the accent put on mathematics, an 
accent that derived from the importance given to them in aristocratic education. 
For the young aristocrat eager to serve in the army, arithmetic and geometry 
proved essential. Mathematics was not – this is worth noting – conceived as a 
pure exercise of the mind, rather as a tool for action, from artillery and 
fortification to infantry deployment calculations. This conception of mathematics 
not as an abstract set of theories but as the formalization of very practical 
 
3 Blanchard, Les Ingénieurs du "Roy" de Louis XIV à Louis XV.   4 
                                                
questions was to remain characteristic of French engineering.4 It explains, among 
other things why French engineers engaged very early in economics problems and 
calculation.5 To this day, a substantial number of French economists are still 
trained initially as engineers, contrary to the situation that prevails in many other 
countries where economics has less links with engineering. 
 
Until the end of the seventeenth century, the engineer was not accountable to 
society as such. He was primarily obeying the orders of the king, orders that could 
differ vastly from what his subjects might wish. This situation imparted the 
engineers with the conviction that authority was the outcome of an institutional 
legitimacy different from allegedly direct forms of popular expressions. There 
again, this belief was to remain an enduring feature of French technological elites. 
In France, direct democracy was never seen as a natural way to take major 
technological decisions, the most recent example of this attitude being the nuclear 
policy on which French people were never consulted. 
 
In the archeology of French engineering social awareness, the eighteenth century 
represents probably one of the most important episodes. It is the moment when the 
profession emancipated itself from its military roots with the creation of a whole 
range of civil corps, the Ponts et Chaussées corps in charge of the construction of 
roads, bridges and canals, or the Mines corps in charge of mining and industrial 
questions.6 Under the influence of the new political ideals of the time, State 
engineers began to define themselves as contributors to public utility and 
progress. The progress they had in mind was not only material. It possessed a 
strong moral connotation since prosperity was seen as the key to regenerated 
social relations. 
 
The transformation of engineering education in a school-based system, with the 
creation of institutions like the Ecole des Ponts et Chaussées (1747), the Ecole du 
 
4 This crucial point is missing from Eda Kranakis otherwise excellent comparative study: 
Constructing a Bridge. 
5 The work of Jules Dupuit is perhaps the best example of this early interest. Cf. Ekelund and 
Hebert, Secret Origins of Microeconomics. For a broader picture of the contribution of engineers 
to economics and economic calculation, see Etner, Histoire du Calcul Economique en France; F. 
Vatin, Le Travail. 
6 See among others Blanco, Stato e Funzionari nella Francia del Settecento; Picon, L'Invention de 
l'Ingénieur Moderne; Thépot, Les Ingénieurs des Mines du XIXe Siècle.   5 
                                                
Génie (1748), the Ecole des Mines (1783), and the Ecole Polytechnique (1794), 
represents another key element in the picture. It reinforced the elitist nature of the 
profession by transforming it gradually into a meritocracy based on the mastery of 
advanced science, analytical geometry, calculus, mechanics, physics and 
chemistry among others. Although this transformation was accomplished only 
around the 1820s in the curriculum of the Ecole Polytechnique and its dependent 
"schools of application", its premises were already discernible in the educational 
agenda of an institution such as the Ecole du Génie who produced major 
eighteenth-century scientists like Charles-Augustin Coulomb or Pierre-Georges 
Dubuat.7 
 
The most important legacy of the Enlightenment remained however the 
connection established between material and moral progress as well as the 
conviction held by engineers that they were indeed serving public welfare. The 
moral connotation proved especially important for them; engineering, civil 
engineering in particular, was about determining what was good or bad for the 
people. Beside the traditional role model of the officer, another reference appeared 
in the texts of the time, in the writings of the Ponts et Chaussées engineers in 
particular, the one of the judge in charge of deciding what is in the best interest of 
those who come before his court. French eighteenth-century State engineers 
tended to see themselves as judges in charge of determining which the most useful 
projects were for the community.8 
 
This evolution led to a more ambitious vision of what technology could achieve 
for the benefit of all. Comprehensive territorial and urban planning emerged 
during that period. Ponts et Chaussées engineers envisaged for instance the 
transformation of the entire French kingdom into an artfully designed garden like 
territory. With this new kind of project, links began to appear between 
engineering and utopia. These links developed in a spectacular way during the 
first half of the nineteenth century. 
 
 
7 Cf. Taton, Enseignement et Diffusion des Sciences en France au XVIIIe siècle; Gillispie, Science 
and Polity in France at the End of the Old Regime. 
8 This conception represents a major difference between French engineers and their British 
counterparts. See on that subject Picon, "Technological Traditions and National Identities.”   6 
                                                
Two phenomena marked actually the first half of the nineteenth century. The first 
one was the emergence of a series of debates regarding the relations that were to 
prevail between public policies and private initiatives. Who was to pay for 
instance for the transportation infrastructures constructed by the State, for the 
canals and railways in particular; whom should manage them, administration or 
private companies? These crucial questions fostered the development of modern 
political economy and economic calculation, two domains with which French 
engineers were immediately conversant, thus deepening their concern with the 
broader repercussions of their action. 
 
As mentioned above, the strong connection between engineering and social utopia 
represents another key phenomenon. Around 1830, engineers were for example 
extremely present in a utopian movement like Saint-Simonianism.9 According to 
von Hayek, the roots of modern engineering technocratic ideals were to be found 
in the Saint-Simonian doctrine and its advocacy of a totally organized society in 
which scientific and technological competence must take precedence on 
traditional social distinction.10 
 
Despite its seduction, this kind of analysis must be however nuanced. For 
technological competence was supposed to yield to spiritual power in the perfect 
society envisaged by the Saint-Simonians. In many ways, the importance they 
gave to this competence was a follow-up to the Enlightenment conception of the 
almost judicial nature of engineering. In the Saint-Simonian religious frame, the 
judge of public interest became an apostle of progress, but the general perspective 
remained similar. 
 
The most fundamental tendency at work through the adherence of so many 
engineers to Saint-Simonianism, and later to Fourierism, had rather to do with a 
profound denial of the fecundity of political and social conflict. The Saint-
Simonian doctrine was all the more attractive to engineers that it presented itself 
as an antidote to violent conflict between haves and have-nots. The denial of the 
role played by conflict in social dynamics will remain an enduring feature of the 
French engineering profession, contrary to countries like Greece, Algeria or 
 
9 Cf. Picon, Les Saint-Simoniens. 
10 Hayek, The Counter-Revolution of Science.   7 
                                                
Vietnam, for instance, where engineers will be at the forefront of revolutionary 
fight.11 This explains among other things the very weak appeal of Marxism on a 
profession who will always favor class cooperation over class struggle. 
 
The second half of the nineteenth century was probably less decisive in the 
genesis of the French engineers' technocratic ideals. It was nevertheless marked 
by a fundamental evolution: the diversification of a profession that gradually 
extended beyond its administrative cradle.12 Towards the end of the century, civil 
and mechanical engineers working for the private sector had become far more 
numerous than State engineers. Their social conceptions remained however 
strikingly close to those of their colleagues, rooted in the firm belief in the utility 
of the engineer, in his capacity to transcend the interests of his immediate 
employer to serve the common good. The preservation of this common frame of 
thought was made possible by the very peculiar nature of the relation between the 
public and the private sector that had emerged at the time: a relation apprehended 
in terms of interpenetration, hybridization rather than clear-cut opposition. Coined 
later, the expression "économie mixte" conveys well the nature of this intimacy 
between public and private interests that still characterizes France today. 
 
One has actually to wait until the beginning of the twentieth century to observe 
the first unequivocal expressions of technocratic ideals among French engineers. 
Their emergence is almost contemporary with similar developments in the United 
States. The French term "technocratie" is actually an importation from the 
American word technocracy invented to name a program of political and 
economical reform that would empower the engineers and more generally the 
scientific and technological experts.13 Jut like their American counterparts, in the 
early 1930s, the think tank X-Crise, created by former graduates of the Ecole 
Polytechnique in order to identify solutions to the post-1929 economic slump 
advocated the replacement of existing political structures by a scientific and 
 
11 The comparison between the political itineraries of French alumni of the Ecole Polytechnique 
and of some of their Foreign colleagues is especially revealing in that respect. See Karvar, "Les 
Polytechnciens Etrangers et les Mouvements Nationaux." On the Greek case, one should mention 
the definitive work of Y. Antoniou: Oi Ellines Michanikoi (The Greek Engineers). See also 
Antoniou et al., “The National Identity of Inter-war Greek Engineers,” in the present issue.  
12 See for instance Weiss, The Making of Technological Man; Auclair, Les Ingénieurs et 
l'Equipement de la France; Garçon, Entre l'Etat et l'Usine. 
13 Cf. Layton, The Revolt of Engineers; Akin, Technocracy and the American Dream.   8 
                                                
technology-based power.14 The young and ambitious civil servants that gathered 
later around the Vichy government in the aftermath of the 1940 collapse of almost 
all the political structures of the Third Republic (1871-1940) were also guided by 
the conviction that traditional politics had to be replaced by rational management 
based on science and technology.15 
 
Various factors converged to explain this evolution. Some were by no means 
specific to the French scene, like the growing dissatisfaction of engineers in front 
of the recurring and seemingly sterile confrontations between Capital and Labor 
that occurred in most industrialized countries. Frederick Winslow Taylor's 
scientific management was from the start intended as a possible solution to this 
problem, a solution precisely based on the mediation of technological competence 
in order to make compatible the exigencies of employers and workers. It is no 
coincidence if most early-twentieth-century technocracy-leaning engineers were 
fervent supporters of scientific management. 
 
The 1929 crisis and the massive unemployment problems that followed represent 
another common factor to countries like France and the United States.16 The 
frustrations it created fueled the desire for an alternative political organization 
giving precedence to a rational management of people and resources, a rational 
management seen as the only solution to unemployment. 
 
The various episodes evoked previously and their legacy, like the French 
engineers' conviction to belong to an elite or their conception of their social role, 
played also a fundamental role. Recurring practices, like the elaboration of 
ambitious plans for territories, cities and infrastructures, gave also their 
technocratic ideals a specific tone. France's technological trajectory was marked 
by a series of vast programs or "plans", from the 1821-1822 "Plan Becquey" 
aiming at the completion of French canals to the 1967 "Plan Calcul" meant to 
foster French computing industry.17 The connection between technocratic 
 
14 X-Crise, De la récurrence des crises économiques. 
15 Brun, Technocrates et Technocratie en France (1914-1945). 
16 On the French situation created by the 1929 crisis, see Grelon, Les Ingénieurs de la Crise. 
17 On this tendency to conceive grand programs, see Smith, "The Longest Run: Public Engineers 
and Planning in France." On the "Plan Calcul", see Pierre Mounier-Kuhn, "Le Plan Calcul, Bull et 
l'Industrie des Composants."   9 
                                                
attitudes and planning was to represent an important feature of Post-War French 
modernization through institutions like the DATAR, the Délégation à 
l'Aménagement et à l'Action Régionale, created in 1963 to coordinate the 
territorial enterprises of the State.18 
 
The first decade of the Fifth Republic coincided with the culmination of the 
technocratic ideals of the French engineering profession. For the first time, these 
ideals translated further into a set of concrete practices that changed the visage of 
France. While the Mines engineers corps launched an ambitious nuclear program, 
the Ponts et Chaussées administration was busy planning giant infrastructures and 
new towns with an authority it had never possessed to such a degree before. 
 
Despite their authoritarian character, these practices were never as radical in their 
attempt to dismiss traditional political mechanisms as those led by proponents of 
operation research and system analysis in some bureaucratic circles of the United 
States, from the rationalization of the Department of Defense decisions to the 
urban renewal enterprises led in the name of Lyndon Johnson's "Great Society".19 
There again, clichés must be avoided. For centuries of association between the 
French engineering profession and the elites ruling the country provided the 
former with a political culture that many American technocrats of the 1950s and 
1960s did not possess. Even in the most technocratic phase of their history, 
French engineers did not envisage an almost complete substitution of rational 
decisions methods to traditional political deliberation. For sure, in matters like 
nuclear policy or territorial and urban planning, political deliberation was not as 
dependent on popular vote in France as similar questions were in the United 
States. But this lesser degree of dependence diminished the temptation to get 
totally rid of politics. Somewhat paradoxically, the less democratic nature of 
French technological policies was also what limited their transformation into 
totally technocratic procedures. 
 
After its early 1960s climax, French technocratic ideals and practices began to 
recede. Society was changing at a rapid pace, and the events of 1968 marked the 
emergence of new generations that were not longer ready to accept passively 
 
18 Cf. Laborie et al., La PolitiqueFrançaise d'Aménagement du Territoire. 
19 See for instance Hughes and Hughes, Systems, Experts, and Computers; Light, From Warfare 
to Welfare.   10 
                                                
technological policies developed in the name of public welfare by State engineers. 
In the later decades, this dismissal of technocratic ideals and practices was to take 
various forms, from the systematic opposition to the nuclear industry fueled by 
ecological movements groups to the severe criticism of modern urbanism and 
landscape led by all sorts of groups, from politics to occupants associations. 
 
 
REFLECTIONS ON THE FRENCH SPECIFICITY 
 
Taking stock, the history of the French engineering profession bears the mark of a 
series of paradoxes. First, contrary to the common assumption, the true 
technocratic episodes come relatively late in an evolution which is marked by a 
collusion between technological and traditional political elites rather than by their 
opposition one to another. A second paradox stems from the fact that French 
engineers are from the start decidedly non-specialized and somewhat messianic in 
their approach of technology as well as in their ambition to use it to service 
society. This generalist and messianic perspective, so fundamentally different 
from their British counterparts more pragmatic point of view, is also among the 
features that make them so specific. 
 
This specificity is rooted in the seminal role played by the State in the emergence 
of the profession. One must note however that France is not the only country 
where the State has been so influential on engineering. Spain, Russia or even the 
United States with the Army Corps of Engineers represent other cases. A series of 
features must be taken into account to understand better the French situation. 
 
Among the most important ones, one finds the existence of the "économie mixte", 
this hybrid of public initiative and private capital that has marked for so long 
French economic life.20 Without such a twilight zone it would have been more 
difficult for engineers to maintain their claim to be working for public welfare 
even when they were privately employed. It is only recently, under the pressure of 
globalization, that this feature has been receding. 
 
 
20 See for instance on that key French legal and economical notion: S. Guérard, Regards Croisés 
sur l'Economie Mixte.   11 
                                                
Another key feature of the French scene is the moral and cultural legitimacy of the 
State, there again an aspect that has begun to decline only a few years ago. Until 
then, the State was seen as the only true guarantor for civic values and social 
bond. Through State-controlled intellectual, scientific and artistic institutions like 
academies and schools, the public sector was also invested with an indisputable 
cultural legitimacy. Since its most prestigious schools were public, engineering 
education was among the beneficiaries of such a situation. 
 
The consequence of this moral and cultural legitimacy was the trust that was 
granted to the State and its engineers, a trust without equivalent in the United 
States, as Theodore Porter has shown in an enlightening comparative essay.21 
Without this public trust, policies like the civil nuclear program would have 
sooner or later met a strong opposition from some politicians as well as from the 
people. Public trust was also among the factors that limited somewhat the 
technocratic temptation among post-War French engineers. Why indeed oppose 
scientific and technological competence to political legitimacy, when the latter 
readily recognized the value of the former? 
 
Another specificity of French engineering is its judicial inspiration. More than 
mere technicians, French engineers, especially the members of preeminent State 
corps, have a tendency to consider themselves as arbitrators of interests. Many 
engineers have tried to achieve this status all over the world. In France, at least for 
the higher levels of the profession, it was something almost evident. 
 
The importance given to a general, relatively abstract and mathematics-based 
education is related to that last feature. Until the present day, it is not a know-how 
that one is supposed to learn in a prestigious French engineering school, but 
principles comparable to the fundamentals of law. In this type of institution, the 
link between mathematics and economics is interpreted in the same perspective. 
Economics is seen as an essential instrument in order to arbitrate between often 
divergent interests. 
 
These ideological structures account partly for the precedence given to 
cooperation rather than conflict that characterizes French engineer’s social 
 
21 Porter, Trust in Numbers.   12 
                                                
approach. French engineers have always had a tendency to reason in terms of 
negotiation and adjustments rather in terms of blunt confrontation. For a 
sociologist initially trained as engineer (at Ecole des Mines de Paris) like Michel 
Callon, the embrace of the science studies credo can be interpreted in such a 
perspective.22 But putting the accent on process of mutual adaptation within 
networks of actors instead of emphasizing their brutal fight for power, the science 
studies theoretical frame is strangely in tune with the traditional social vision of 
French engineering elites. 
 
Finally, the history of French engineering leaning presents a striking case where 
political discontinuities are counterbalanced by strong continuities within the 
profession itself. Despite the impact of events ranging from the 1789 revolution to 
the 1940 collapse of the Third Republic, the study of French engineering social 
conceptions and technocratic inclinations reveals a progressive evolution rather 
than a series of dramatic breaks. 
 
This story is different in that respect from what has happened in other countries 
where the engineering profession was profoundly changed by political events to 
which engineers participated actively. Whereas engineers were extremely present 
in the political history of countries like Greece, Algeria or Vietnam, as we have 
mentioned it before, French engineers kept a relatively lower political profile.23 
In France, with the exception of the Terror and its so-called "revolutionary 
productions", there was no profound connection between revolution and the 
concern for technological progress carried by the engineering profession.24 
Technology and engineering were indeed associated to progressive ideals. But 
they were supposed to put an end to revolution, to make it impossible in the Saint-
Simonian perspective, rather than foster it. Despite almost two centuries of 
evolution, French engineers never totally repudiated this perspective. 
 
 
 
22 The engineers of the Mines corps have a long tradition of social concern. They were especially 
present in the Saint-Simonian movement and later in movements like X-Crise. This social concern 
has also permeated the other alumni of the Ecole des Mines, the civil engineers like Michel Callon. 
23 The Third Republic represents in that respect an exception. See Marnot, Les Ingénieurs au 
Parlement sous la IIIe République. 
24 On the episode of the "revolutionary productions", see Dhombres and Dhombres, Naissance 
d'un Nouveau Pouvoir.   13 
                                                
LESSONS FROM A CASE STUDY 
 
Now, what can we learn from the French case? Despite its strong peculiarities, it 
presents features that are perhaps more general than one might think at first. What 
it tends to suggest is that engineering history bears a closer link to social ideals 
and strategies than to industrial techniques and technologies proper. 
 
Contrary to a common assumption, the role played by engineers in industrial 
change is often difficult to assess precisely. For a very long time, industry had 
little use of engineers. This was especially the case in France where they were 
concentrated in domains like civil engineering and construction.25 They proved 
however crucial as soon as technology and industry became synonymous with 
complex problems of organization, of social organization to be more precise. In 
other words, despite affirmations to the contrary, often emanating from 
representatives of the profession, engineers may very well of relatively minor 
importance in many processes of innovation. After all, most of them hold 
positions of production management in which organizational skills are more 
important than mere technological inventiveness. 
 
In a profession that tends to assimilate technology to technological and social 
organization, the technocratic temptation is no accident. It appears rather as the 
result of an unavoidable evolution, an evolution constitutive of the engineer's 
identity in our societies. There again, the French trajectory is rather extreme since 
engineering is from the start understood as a social activity, but it is 
simultaneously paradigmatic. 
 
The depth of the link between engineering and concerns of social organization and 
welfare explains why we are confronted with a profound crisis of the engineer's 
identity these days. With the demise of former beliefs regarding the equivalence 
between technological progress and social welfare, the very ideological bases of 
the engineering profession are undermined. Nowhere is this situation more 
evident than among French State engineers whose usefulness is more and more 
openly challenged. 
 
25 Machine builders were not considered as engineers. Cf. Edmonson,  "From Mécanicien to 
Ingénieur."   14 
                                                
 
Once again, taking the full measure of French engineering history specificity is a 
precondition for truly convincing comparative studies. It would be interesting to 
put side by side in that perspective the French technocratic circles of the 1930s, 
like X-Crise, and their American counterparts. In the same vein some French Fifth 
Republic engineering practices are close to contemporary American cybernetic 
and systemic endeavors. The present situation of incertitude is also calling for 
comparative studies between well-identified local and national situations. 
 
If one looks at the evolution of engineering history as a discipline, one cannot but 
be struck by the successive shifts in its fundamental assumptions. At the 
beginning, this history was centered on the allegedly universally valid 
achievements of engineering, while interpreting them at the same time and not 
without inconsequence as embodiments of national geniuses. In a later phase, 
engineering history became more precise and local, while paying attention to the 
circulation of patterns and models from one local scene to another. This was the 
time when one spoke readily of a French or a British model influencing countries 
like the United States, Russia or Egypt.26 Today, historians have become 
probably even more aware of local specificities to a point that makes it difficult to 
speak of models and to reduce international exchanges to their circulation. It does 
not mean that nothing circulate, far from it. As I have tried to show in this paper, 
French engineering is both much more specific than one supposed – so specific 
that characterizations based on factors like the importance played by the State 
remain probably too general to constitute a sufficient explanation – and 
representative of broader issues present in many other national situations. The 
problem then becomes how to explain phenomena of coincidence or convergence 
like the technocratic leaning common to so many engineers throughout the world 
towards the mid twentieth century. Because of this kind of problem, and despite 
the identity crisis currently encountered by engineers, we still have a lot to learn 
from engineering history. 
 
 
 
 
26 See for instance Ghilaine Alleaume, L'Ecole Polytechnique du Caire et ses Elèves; Grelon et 
al., La Formation des Ingénieurs en Perspective.   15 
REFERENCES 
 
Akin, William E. Technocracy and the American Dream: The Technocrat 
Movement 1900-1941. Berkeley and Los Angeles: University of California Press, 
1977. 
Alder, Ken. Engineering the Revolution: Arms and Enlightenment in France, 
1763-1815. Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1997. 
Alleaume, Ghilaine. "L'Ecole Polytechnique du Caire et ses Elèves: La Formation 
d'une Elite Technique dans l'Egypte du XIXe Siècle." Ph.D. Diss., Université 
Lyon II, 1993. 
Antoniou, Yiannis. Oi Ellines Michanikoi, 1900-1940. Thesmoi kai Idees (The 
Greek Engineers 1900-1940. Ideas and Institutions). Athens: Vibliorama, 2006. 
Auclair, Alain. Les Ingénieurs et l'Equipement de la France. Eugène Flachat 
(1802-1873). Le Creusot: Ecomusée de la Communauté urbaine Le Creusot- 
Montceau-les-Mines, 1999. 
Belhoste, Bruno. La Formation d'une Technocratie: L'Ecole Polytechnique et ses 
Elèves de la Révolution au Second Empire. Paris: Belin, 2003. 
Blanchard, Anne. Les Ingénieurs du "Roy" de Louis XIV à Louis XVI: Etude du 
Corps des Fortifications. Montpellier: Université Paul Valéry, 1979. 
Blanco, Luigi. Stato e Funzionari nella Francia del Settecento: Gli "Ingénieurs 
des Ponts et Chaussées". Bologna: Il Mulino, 1991. 
Brun, Gérard. Technocrates et Technocratie en France (1914-1945). Paris: 
Albatros, 1985. 
Dhombres J., and N. Dhombres. Naissance d'un Nouveau Pouvoir: Sciences et 
Savants en France (1798-1824). Paris: Payot, 1989. 
Ekelund, Robert B., and Robert Hébert. Secret Origins of Modern 
Microeconomics: Dupuit and the Engineers, Chicago: University of Chicago 
Press, 1999. 
Etner, François. Histoire du Calcul Economique en France. Paris: Economica, 
1987. 
Garçon, Anne-Françoise. Entre l'Etat et l'Usine. L'Ecole des Mines de Saint-
Etienne au XIXe Siècle. Rennes: Presses Universitaires de Rennes, 2004. 
Gillispie, Charles Coulston. Science and Polity in France at the End of the Old 
Regime. Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1980. 
Grelon, André, ed. Les Ingénieurs de la Crise. Titre et Profession Entre les Deux 
Guerres. Paris: Editions de l'EHESS, 1986.   16 
Grelon A., A. Karvar, and I. Gouzevitch, eds. La Formation des Ingénieurs en 
Perspective: Modèles de Référence et Réseaux de Médiation XVIIIème-XXème 
Siècle. Rennes: Presses Universitaires de Rennes, 2004. 
Guérard, Stéphane, ed. Regards Croisés sur l'Economie Mixte. Paris: 
L'Harmattan, 2006. 
Hayek, Friedrich August von. The Counter-Revolution of Science. 1952, new ed. 
New-York: Free press of Glencoe, London, Collier-Mac-Millan, 1955. 
Hecht, Gabrielle. The Radiance of France: Nuclear Power and National Identity 
after World War II. Cambridge, Masschusetts; MIT Press, 1998. 
Hughes A. C., and T. P. Hughes, eds. Systems, Experts, and Computers: The 
System Approach in Management and Engineering, World War II and After. 
Cambridge, Masschusetts: MIT Press, 2000. 
Karvar, Anousheh. "Les Polytechiens Etrangers et les Mouvements Nationaux." 
In La France des X: Deux Siècles d'Histoire, edited by B. Belhoste, A. Dahan-
Dalmedico, D. Pestre and A. Picon. Paris: Economica, 1995. 
Kranakis, Eda. Constructing a Bridge: An Exploration of Engineering Culture, 
Design, and Research in Nineteenth-Century France and America. Cambridge, 
Massachusetts: MIT Press, 1997. 
Laborie, J.-P., J.-F. Langumier, and P. de Roo. La PolitiqueFrançaise 
d'Aménagement du Territoire de 1950 à 1985. Paris: La Documentation française, 
1985. 
Layton, Edwin T. The Revolt of Engineers: Social Responsibility and the 
American Engineering Profession. 1971, new ed. Baltimore: John Hopkins 
University Press, 1986. 
Light, Jennifer S. From Warfare to Welfare: Defense Intellectual and Urban 
Problems in Cold War America. Baltimore, London: Johns Hopkins University 
Press, 2003. 
Marnot, Bruno. Les Ingénieurs au Parlement sous la IIIe République. Paris: 
CNRS Editions, 2000. 
Edmonson James M., "From Mécanicien to Ingénieur: Technical Education and 
the Machine Building Industry in Nineteenth-Century France." Ph.D. Diss., 
University of Delaware, 1981. 
Mounier-Kuhn, Pierre. "Le Plan Calcul, Bull et l'Industrie des Composants: Les 
Contradictions d’une Stratégie." In Actes du 3e colloque Histoire de 
l'informatique, Sophia-Antipolis: INRIA, 1993.   17 
Picon, Antoine. L'Invention de l'Ingénieur Moderne: L'Ecole des Ponts et 
Chaussées, 1747-1851. Paris: Presses de l'Ecole nationale des Ponts et Chaussées, 
1992. 
-------. "Technological Traditions and National Identities: A Comparison between 
France and Great Britain during the 19th Century." In Science, Technology and 
the 19th Century State, edited by E. Nicolaïdis and K. Chatzis, Athens: 
Neohellenic Research Institute, 2000. 
Picon, Antoine. Les Saint-Simoniens: Raison, Imaginaire et Utopie. Paris: Belin, 
2002. 
Porter, Theodore M. Trust in Numbers: The Pursuit of Objectivity in Science and 
Public Life. Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1995. 
Smith, Cecil O. "The Longest Run: Public Engineers and Planning in France." The 
American Historical Review 95 (1990): 657-692. 
Taton, René, ed. Enseignement et Diffusion des Sciences en France au XVIIIe 
siècle. Paris: Hermann, 1964. 
Thépot, André. Les Ingénieurs des Mines du XIXe Siècle: Histoire d'un Corps 
Technique d'Etat (1810-1914). Paris: ESKA, 1998. 
Vatin, François. Le Travail: Economie et physique 1780-1830. Paris: P.U.F., 
1993. 
Weiss, John H. The Making of Technological Man: The Social Origins of French 
Engineering Education. Cambridge, Massachusetts: MIT Press, 1982. 
X-Crise: De la récurrence des crises économiques. Son cinquantenaire (1931-
1981). Paris: Economica, 1982. 